Hawk and Dove

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Information density, games and theory · page 8 of 11 · signed {{+L.-E.+O. D++}}

WINNERThe evolutionarily stable strategy (Maynard Smith & Price 1973): in hawk–dove with prize V and fight cost C > V, the population settles at a hawk share of V/C. If V ≥ C, hawks take over.
CHALLENGER“Fighting is restrained for the good of the species”, the group-selection account (Wynne-Edwards 1962). The ESS explains restraint from individual payoffs alone, and this is the account that won.

V C (tap to start a population)



LITMaynard Smith & Price 1973 as cited. COMPUTEDReplicator runs are live. MODELCross-link only, with no mechanics shared: GOD EGG v5’s diatom (−) / tardigrade (+) gradient. No biological meaning is claimed.
J. Maynard Smith & G. R. Price, Nature 246:15 (1973); V. C. Wynne-Edwards, Animal Dispersion in Relation to Social Behaviour (1962).


Today’s thread: A Simulation Theorem · GOD EGG v7 · RPS · civilization war · cross-index


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