THE EVOLUTIONARILY STABLE STRATEGY

A strategy that, once common, no mutant can invade. Give the population a resource of value V and a fight that costs C in injury; when V<C the stable population is a knife-edge mix of Hawk and Dove — bluff and fight in exactly the proportion that makes deviation pay less. Rendered, not quoted.

source Maynard Smith, J. & Price, G.R. — The Logic of Animal Conflict, Nature 246, 15–18 (1973), DOI 10.1038/246015a0.

Blue Team · builds & defends
3

THE MODEL

Symmetric two-player contest. Each animal plays Hawk (escalate) or Dove (display, retreat if attacked). Expected payoffs:

E(H,H) = (V−C)/2   both risk injury
E(H,D) = V   Hawk takes it all
E(D,H) = 0   Dove yields
E(D,D) = V/2   share the resource

A strategy S is an ESS if, for every mutant T≠S:

E(S,S) > E(T,S)  OR
[ E(S,S) = E(T,S)  AND  E(S,T) > E(T,T) ].

First clause = strict best reply to itself. Second = when a mutant ties on the incumbent, the incumbent must beat the mutant against the mutant.

5

THE LINEAGE

the-nash-equilibrium, hardened against mutation. Nash asks only that no player gains by unilateral switch. Maynard Smith's biology adds a second-order test — a tie against the incumbent is not enough; the incumbent must out-earn the invader inside the invaded pool.

The mixed ESS is exactly the interior Nash equilibrium, and it is the asymptotically stable rest point of the-replicator-dynamics: perturb the population share and it flows back to Hawk-fraction V/C.

7

THE WITNESS

Live re-check. Re-derives the ground truth with the tamper flag forced OFF, compares it to the engine's current live verdict, and confirms the closed-form invasion margin. Flips red the instant window 6 plants its void.

witness idle

The Machine
4

DATA IN in ▼

Set the resource value and the injury cost. The mixed case needs V<C.

1.00
0

THE PANEL LIT

payoff to ROW against COLUMN
vs Hawkvs Dove
Hawk
Dove

Mixed ESS S* plays Hawk with probability = V/C.

Invasion test of incumbent S* vs mutant q (Hawk-share):

E(S,S)=   E(T,S)=
E(S,T)=   E(T,T)=
margin E(S,T)−E(T,T) =  (closed form (C/2)(p*−q)²)

Pure all-Hawk verdict (this is what window 6 attacks):

8

DATA OUT out ▼

Proven result: when V<C the unique ESS is the mix S* = (Hawk with prob V/C). All-Hawk is a Nash-candidate that fails invasion resistance; the interior mix passes.

booting…

Red Team · attacks & breaks
1

THE ADVERSARY WALL

"ESS = Nash. Solve the equilibrium and you're done." False. Nash permits ties; a neutral or better mutant can drift in. ESS demands the strict second-order margin. The game [[1,0],[0,0]] has a Nash (play B) that any A-mutant erodes — Nash-not-ESS is real and window 0 exhibits it.

"The pure aggressive type wins." Only if V≥C. With V<C an all-Hawk world earns (V−C)/2 < 0 per contest; a single Dove scoring 0 beats it and spreads.

2

THE GRAVEYARD

"An ESS is any strategy no one wants to deviate from."
→ that is Nash. ESS adds: incumbent must out-earn a tying mutant against the mutant.

"The mixed ESS plays Hawk half the time."
→ only when C=2V. In general the Hawk-share is exactly V/C.

"Every game has an ESS."
→ AMBER: some symmetric games have none (e.g. rock–paper–scissors payoff cycles admit no ESS, only a Nash mix).

6

THE TAMPER

Planted void (disclosed): force the engine to declare pure all-Hawk an ESS while V<C. A Dove mutant earns 0 against the Hawk pool while Hawk earns (V−C)/2<0, so invasion-resistance is false — the witness in window 7 must catch it.