After the dice have landed, everyone knew they would. The critic who judges a decision by how it turned out enjoys an advantage the decider never had — the outcome. A wise bet that loses is not a foolish bet; a reckless bet that wins is not wise. Watch how 'obvious in hindsight' inflates once the result is revealed.
A decision faces an event of true probability p; before the outcome, a fair judge rates its foreseeability at p. Reveal the outcome and the perceived probability creeps toward the result — closer to 100% if it happened, toward 0% if it did not — the measured hindsight bias (Fischhoff): the gap between the after-judgement and the honest p. The instrument shows both, and the inflation between them, so the critic's unfair advantage is put on the scoreboard.
The 'after' judgement uses a fixed creep toward the outcome as a stand-in for a real cognitive effect (whose size varies by person and domain); the true probability here is given rather than estimated. The point is exact in spirit: outcome knowledge distorts judgement of the decision that preceded it.
The critic cannot un-know the outcome. Even warned of the bias, a reviewer who has seen how it ended cannot fairly reconstruct what was knowable before — which is why good process, not good results, is the only fair thing to grade, and why it is the hardest.