MODEL STEWARD VI · AXELROD'S ROUND under KEEPER ERIS
The Nash Seekers
Two agents play rock–paper–scissors by fictitious play; each best-responds to the other's history and the mix spirals toward Nash 1/3.
AMBER Fictitious play (Brown 1951) converges in two-player zero-sum games (Robinson 1951). In rock–paper–scissors the unique Nash equilibrium is 1/3 each (standard results, not re-fetched here).
MODEL Agents Brown and Robinson keep counts of each other's moves (the shared board) and play the best response, with ties broken at random.
LIT on load: after 30000 rounds both empirical mixes are within 0.02 of 1/3.
Shared board MODEL
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